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Abstract The attack on September 11, 2001 set off
numerous efforts to counter terrorism and insurgencies.
Central to these efforts has been the drive to improve data
collection and analysis. Section 1 summarizes some of the
more notable improvements among U.S. government
agencies as they strive to develop their capabilities.
Although progress has been made, daunting challenges
remain. Section 2 reviews the basic challenges to data
collection and analysis focusing in some depth on the
difficulties of data integration. Three general approaches to
data integration are identified—discipline-centric, placed-
centric and virtual. A summary of the major challenges in
data integration confronting field operators in Iraq and
Afghanistan illustrates the work that lies ahead. Section 3
shifts gears to focus on the future and introduces the
discipline of Visual Analytics—an emerging field dedicated
to improving data collection and analysis through the use of
computer-mediated visualization techniques and tools. The
purpose of Visual Analytics is to maximize human
capability to perceive, understand, reason, make judgments
and work collaboratively with multidimensional, conflicting,
and dynamic data. The paper concludes with two excellent
examples of analytic software platforms that have been
developed for the intelligence community—Palantir and
ORA. They signal the progress made in the field of Visual
Analytics to date and illustrate the opportunities that await
other IS researchers interested in applying their knowledge
and skills to the tracking and disrupting of dark networks.
Keywords Dark networks . Visual analytics . Data
collection . Analysis and fusion
The attack on September 11, 2001 set off numerous efforts
to counter terrorism and insurgencies ranging from military
interventions to the development of new technologies and
tools. Central to many has been the drive to improve data
collection and data analytic capabilities (Larson et al. 2008;
Treverton 2009; Treverton and Gabbard 2008; Treverton
et al. 2006).
Data collection, defined as the process of gathering raw
data and information from many different sources, both open
and secret, employs a range of technologies and methods. Six
categories typically describe the major data or intelligence1
sources: Signals Intelligence (SIGNIT), Imagery Intelligence
(IMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence,
(MASINT), Human-source Intelligence (HUMINT), Open
Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Geospatial Intelligence
(GEOINT).
SIGNIT data are obtained from various types of signals. It
is subdivided into three categories: Communication Intelli-
gence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and
Foreign Instrumentation Intelligence (FISNT). COMINT is
the interception of signals between people. ELINT is the
interception of signals between machines and people or
mixtures between COMINT and ELINT. And FISINT is the
interception of signals from foreign instrumentation.
IMINT comes from visual photography, radar sensors,
infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics that are repro-
duced electronically or by optical means on film electronic
1 The Department of Defense defines intelligence as “information and
knowledge obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or
understanding” (Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as
amended 15 Oct 2001, p. 214.
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display devices, or other media. MASINT is technically
derived data other than imagery and signal intelligence. These
data are gathered from technically measurable aspects of a
target such as its vibrations or hyper-spectral emissions (e.g.
radar signatures and acoustic and seismic signals). HUMINT
is derived from people through photography, documents,
debriefings, and official contacts with foreign governments.
OSINT is publicly available information appearing in print
and electronic form (e.g. radio, television, newspapers,
journals, the Internet, commercial databases, videos, graphics,
and drawings). GEOINT is the analysis and visual represen-
tation of security related activities on the earth. It is produced
through an integration of imagery, imagery intelligence, and
geospatial information (Best 2006).2
Data analysis is the ability to make sense of the collected
information by processing, converting, integrating, evaluat-
ing, and analyzing the available data. It begins with analysts
processing the collected data and converting them into usable
forms through decryption, language translations, and data
reduction. Analysts then piece together disparate data, re-
represent them as needed, and probe for connections and
patterns. Ultimately, the purpose in counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency is to develop insights and judgments to
explain what is happening and when, who is involved, and
where it is occurring. Data analysis is thus a challenging
integration effort that pulls together information into a
coherent whole, puts it into context, and quickly creates a
consolidated situational assessment. Assessments then inform
the decision process and enable decisionmakers to take timely
and appropriate action (Treverton and Gabbard 2008).
Work is underway throughout the U.S. intelligence
community to improve data collection and data analytic
capabilities. Section 1 of the paper summarizes some of the
more notable efforts among U.S. government agencies.
Their extensive plans and contributions, many launched
after 9–11, are impressive in such a short period of time.
However, daunting challenges remain.
Section 2 reviews some of the basic challenges to data
collection in general and to the collection of terrorism and
insurgency data in particular. It also describes in some
depth the analytical challenge of data analysis focusing on
data integration or synthesis. I identify three general
approaches to integration: disciplined-based; placed-
based; and virtual. Section 2 concludes with a summary
of the major challenges confronting field operators in Iraq
and Afghanistan in the collection and analysis of data.
Section 3 shifts gears to focus on the future. I briefly
describe the discipline of Visual Analytics—an emerging
field dedicated to improving data collection and analysis
through the use of computer-mediated visualization techni-
ques and tools. The purpose of Visual Analytics is to
maximize human capability to perceive, understand, reason,
make judgments and work collaboratively with multidimen-
sional, conflicting, and dynamic data, such as terrorism and
counterinsurgency data. The paper concludes with two
excellent examples of analytic software platforms that have
been developed for the intelligence community—Palantir and
ORA. They signal the progress made in the field of Visual
Analytics to date and illustrate the opportunities that await
other IS researchers interested in applying their knowledge
and skills to the tracking and disrupting of dark networks.
1 Intelligence community’s improvements in data
collection and data analysis
The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is a
federation of 16 separate U.S. government agencies that
work together to conduct intelligence activities. As we see
in Table 1, member organizations of the IC include
intelligence agencies, and military intelligence and civilian
intelligence analysis offices within Cabinet departments
(Best 2006).3
The IC is led by the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), the US Government official responsible for advising
the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council about intelligence matters
related to national security. The Director also serves as
head of the sixteen-member Intelligence Community, and in
this capacity, manages the intelligence cycle (Tenet 1999;
Waltz 2003).
The Office of National Intelligence (ONI) houses centers
important to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, two
of which are pertinent for data collection and data analysis:
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the
Center for Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The
NCTC is the primary organization for integration and
analysis of all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and
counterterrorism. It also conducts strategic operational
planning by integrating all instruments of national power.
The ISE promotes an information sharing culture among
ISE partners and facilitates the sharing of timely, validated,
protected, and actionable terrorism information. Its inte-
grated approach supports the establishment of an Integrated
Network of Fusion Centers. Since 2001, the U.S. Federal
Government has provided significant grant funding to
support the establishment of fusion centers owned and
operated by States and major urban areas.
Improvements in data collection and analysis are being
made within the U.S. intelligence community. For example,
2 See also “An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community
2007”. (http://www.dni.gov/what_collection.htm).
3 See also “An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community
2007” (http://www.dni.gov/overview.pdf).
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In October 2005, the National Clandestine Service was
established at CIA to undertake HUMINT operations and
coordinate HUMINT efforts by other intelligence agencies.
The CIA also houses the Technology Innovation Center
(ITIC) and In-Q-Tel and its in-house CIA counterpart, the
In-Q-Tel Interface Center (QIC). Through these entities, the
CIA is linking its requirements with new technologies. The
CIA has also developed the Trident workstation that
segregates the data and software layer that can undergo
constant changes with new modifications, versions, and
products. It is also experimenting with other products such
as Inspire that maps key messages or key words where
there is similarity to enable analysts to get a quick picture
of the message traffic. Other features of its systems include
quick machine translations, a video library with trans-
lations, a mapping function, data visualization extraction,
intelligent agents, link and relationship analysis, and search
and retrieval to sort people, places and things (Treverton
and Gabbard 2008, pp. 25–26). Despite the changes in the
Intelligence Reform Act, the CIA continues to be the
keystone of the Intelligence Community with its all-source
analytical capabilities that cover the whole world outside
U.S. borders.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), a
primary producer of geospatial intelligence (e.g. maps and
imagery), is attempting to digitize all geospatial intelligence
to aid in the processing and dissemination of the gathered
intelligence, as well as the fusing of it with other
intelligence resources.4 It also plans to deploy a Future
Imagery Architecture which consists of a large number of
small imagery satellites to provide more persistent and
better coverage of areas of interest than today’s satellite
architecture. An effort to make geo-location information for
precision strikes in every location the services continues.5
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) is
focusing on interoperability and networking to ensure that
collected data are available to all entities working in the
same theater. Central to this effort is ASD/C3I’s coordina-
tion of the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS). It
is a single, integrated architecture that is tailored to receive
and process different types of data which come in different
forms and often in different networks, to support analysis of
the data, and to distribute intelligence to their users both on
the battlefield and higher headquarters.6
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), established in 1999 to
improve interoperability among the services, is pulling
together Joint Interface Control teams comprised of special-




Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (https://www.cia.gov/)
United States Department of Defense (DOD) ( http://www.defenselink.mil/)
Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AF ISR or AIA)
(http://www.afisr.af.mil/)
Army Military Intelligence (MI) (http://www.us-army-info.com/pages/mos/intelligence/intelligence.html)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (http://www.dia.mil/)
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) (http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCIA)
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/nga01/)
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (http://www.nro.gov/)
National Security Agency (NSA) (http://www.nsa.gov/)
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) (http://www.nmic.navy.mil/)
United States Department of Energy (http://www.energy.gov/)
Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) (http://www.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/
intelligence_counterterrorism.htm)
United States Department of Homeland Security (http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm)
Office of Intelligence Analysis (OIA) (http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/#1)
Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI) (http://www.uscg.mil/history/faqs/CGI.asp)
United States Department of Justice (http://www.usdoj.gov/)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (http://www.fbi.gov/)
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm)
United States Department of State (http://www.state.gov/)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) (http://www.state.gov/s/inr/)
United States Department of Treasury (http://www.ustreas.gov/)
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/)
Table 1 Sixteen-member intel-
ligence community agencies
and organizations
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improve communications among intelligence sources in
Afghanistan (Carter 2008). JFCOM is also testing a new
analytical capability known as Operational Net Assessment—
a system of databases, analytical tools, and networks that aim
to fuse intelligence and other data in an interagency
environment (Best 2003; Chizek 2003).
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has been the
military’s source of human intelligence and strategic
analysis since 9–11.7 It also runs several military-wide
programs that support strategic analysis. For example, its
Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture, a collaborative intelli-
gence network, has made major headway in establishing
standardized access to data and analysts throughout
the military intelligence community. The architecture has
incorporated many analytical tools including the Army’s
Pathfinder (see below) as well as a single integrated data base
which seeks to improve analysts’ ability to fuse all sources of
intelligence.8
The military services have been moving toward im-
proved data collection and analysis as well. The Army,
reliant on national agencies and other services for its data
collection, has focused its current research and develop-
ment efforts on analytical tools, especially data fusion and
validation. It has had some success with the Pathfinder text
analysis software, used by the Army’s National Ground
Intelligence Center and now being incorporated into
analysis systems throughout the military. This software
system is reported to be able to sort through 500,000
documents in just a few minutes in order to find patterns
and trends.9 At the tactical level, the Army has formed
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition
(RSTA) squadrons to provide focused analysis for the
brigade commander, in contrast to previous programs that
relied on data collection and analysis at the division and the
corps levels. RSTA squadrons employ the latest technolo-
gies for data collection and analysis and personnel, trained
in data collection and analysis, are expected to operate
directly with tactical patrol units. Ultimately, every soldier,
regardless of occupational specialty, is expected to contribute
his/her observations to the intelligence network.10
The Air Force is creating multiple platforms which
together can watch a battlefield regardless of the terrain,
time of day or weather conditions, and communicate
observations to identify a target, and if necessary, destroy
it within 10 min of the initial observations (Goodman
2003).11 The Air Force also has moved some intelligence
analysis from the IC community directly into operations as
it did in the Air Force’s Checkmate analysis cell that
participated in the planning of air operations for Dessert
Storm (Best 2003; Chizek 2003, p. 26).
The Navy and Marine Corps are focusing on network
centric warfare that links sensors and weapon systems in
local and wide-area networks such as the Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC).12 The Navy is also devel-
oping the Naval Fires Network, the primary program
supporting the Navy’s entire process of identifying targets
and striking them (Nagle 2002).13 The Marine Corps is
expanding its Intelligence Analysis System to bring various
sources of intelligence together for analysis by intelligence
personnel.14 The Coast Guard, having foreseen the need for
shore-based fusion and analysis centers to handle the
increased quantity of intelligence, is coordinating with the
Navy to establish a 24-h operation center on each US coast.
(Best 2003; Chizek 2003).
Special Operation Force (SOF), composed of elite,
specialized military units that can be inserted into enemy
territory, is pursuing the goal of receiving the highest-
quality intelligence at the lowest tactical level. Although its
philosophy is that “humans are more important than
hardware,” it too is acquiring high-quality technical
systems such as the Joint Threat Warning System that
provides a downlink for intelligence broadcasts and a signal
receiver for immediate warning. This system has been
designed in body-ware and maritime-based physical con-
figurations to support different SOF operations throughout
the world. SOFs also have upgraded and modified the
“humvee,” known as the SOF Intelligence Vehicle, with
communications links and analysis terminals to support
analysis for field personnel. During Operational Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan, SOFs demonstrated the ability to
identify and communicate potential targets for aircraft to
strike. It was the first time in combat that GPS and Predator
videos were melded with the observations of SOF personnel
(Best 2003).
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is also
actively participating in the intelligence community’s
efforts to develop an adaptable information architecture
that provides timely, relevant, and precise information to
enable them to collaboratively work with other commands
and agencies to support its Global War on Terror (GWOT)
mission. For example, the Joint Deployable Intelligence
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Evaluation System (JDISS-SOCRATES) is an umbrella
program with the following capabilities: “access to national,
theater, and SOF-specific databases; news service and
message traffic; softcopy imagery processing; imagery
product archiving and dissemination; analyst-to-analyst
electronic mail and chat communications; Intelink and
Intelink-S web servers; and secure voice and facsimile”
(Wurster 2004, p. 9). The Tactical Local Area Network
(TACLAN), an extension of JDISS-SOCRATES, also
“provides a deployable command and control system
capable of sharing operations, intelligence, and administra-
tive information throughout USSOCOM, the Service
components, supported Geographic Combatant Commands,
TSOCs, and deployed task forces in all security domains”
(Wurster 2004, p. 9). The intent is to provide a “nearly
seamless transition of intelligence system connectivity from
home station to combat operations” (Wurster 2004, p. 9).
The Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration
Center (SOJICC) also uses “advanced computing capabil-
ities and nodal analysis to rapidly collate, process, display,
and disseminate relevant information for timely decision
support. The SOJICC information technology is scalable in
design and corresponds to current industry standards in data
mining, data retrieval, data warehousing, knowledge man-
agement, pattern recognition, speech recognition, machine
learning/neural networking, audio and video capture,
parallel/distributive computing, visualization and search
optimization” (Wurster 2004).
The military’s overall progress in data collection and
analysis can best be illustrated with the movement of data
from the reconnaissance platform to the weapon system for
action—the so-called “sensor to shooter” sequence. This
sequence generally required at least a full day in Operation
Desert Storm. First, imagery collected from a satellite or
reconnaissance aircraft had to be analyzed. Then targets had
to be identified. Descriptions of locations had to be turned
into hard-copy and intensively studied by the aircrew
before a weapon could be dropped accurately. In contrast,
it took only 20 min during Operation Enduring Freedom for
Special Operations Forces personnel on the ground to
identify a Taliban troop concentration, call the target back
to the Combined Air Operations Center in Saudi Arabia,
receive permission to call in an air strike, determine the
exact coordinates of the enemy using Global Positioning
System (GPS), and pass those coordinates to a loitering B-
52 bomber using GPS to guide bombs onto the target (Best
2003). Similarly, within minutes of original target identifi-
cation, Predator UAVs are able to transmit live video
pictures to waiting AC-130 gunships which then are able to
attack moving targets while the Predator monitors for
effectiveness (Best 2003). These examples highlight the
recent gains in linking intelligence and operations as well as
interoperability among weapon systems and among the
services. In terms of analysis, the growth of an intelligence-
community-wide secure intranet known as INTELINK has
significantly increased the ability of intelligence personnel
to access to data, reports of all types, and other analysts,
worldwide (Best 2003).
2 Challenges to data collection, processing and analysis
Plans and efforts to counter terrorism, many launched after
9-11, have been impressive in such a short period of time.
However, despite the massive efforts, daunting challenges
remain. This section reviews some of the major challenges
to data collection and analysis in general and to terrorism
and insurgency data collection and analysis in particular.
2.1 Challenges of scalability15
Scalability is a problem that cuts across all phases of data
collection and analysis. It first surfaces in data collection,
sometimes referred to as data acquisition, when we
understand the massive amount of information being
collected. The National Visualization and Analytics Center
(NVAC) warns that the “the scale of data is staggering”
(Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 2). In 2002 alone, it is
estimated that the world produced 5 exabytes (5×1018
bytes) of new stored information in the form of paper, film,
and electronic media and another 18 exabytes of streaming
information. Growth of new storage is estimated to be more
than 30% per year (Lyman and Varian (2003) cited in
Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 24). Although no estimates are
available for the amount and growth of terror-related data,
these data are likely to be growing at a comparable rate.
It is true that advances in computer technology perfor-
mance in terms of processor speed and memory density
(which according to Moore’s Law tends to double every
18 months while graphics technology tends to double every
12 months), there are limits to what humans can do with the
collected data. Although it is a matter of time (some experts
say 10 years or more) before the fundamental limitations of
physics are encountered in computer and graphics technol-
ogy, we are asymptotically approaching the limits of human
capability to process data that are collected (Thomas and
Cook 2005, p. 26). In popular parlance, analysts are
suffering from an information glut and it is expected to
get worse. The problem is human scalability. Human
abilities and skills are relatively fixed; they do not scale
15 Scalability refers to a system’s ability to accommodate a change in
load either through contraction or expansion. It can also refer to the
ease with which a system component can be modified to accommo-
date changes in load.
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(p. 27). Furthermore, although the number of people
involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency data
collection and analysis does scale (at least theoretically), we
do not as yet have the techniques and technology to
“’gracefully scale’ from a single user to a collaborative
(multi-user) environment” (p. 27), especially when working
with geographically dispersed teams speaking different
languages, using different terminology within the same
language, and operating at different levels of expertise in
different organizations and institutions.
In addition, we face problems of information scalability—
the ability to extract relevant information from massive data
streams, filter and reduce the amount of data, represent the
data in a multi-resolution manner, abstract data sets, handle
dynamic data that changes over time, adapt data to different
target audiences, and change between and among scales
(Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 26).
Analysts also confront visual scalability problems—the
ability to visually represent massive data sets in terms of the
number of individual data elements (Eick and Karr 2002 in
Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 26). Currently, only a few
techniques in the area of visual representation can handle
hundreds of thousands up to one million elements in the
data. Yet some counter-terror data requires the processing
of tens of millions of new documents per day, with a total
database size of tens of billions of documents. At least one
existing data base is reported to have 120 billion documents
(Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 26–27). Given the pace of data
acquisition, it seems very likely that these database sizes
will increase dramatically over time.
Display scalability is a related challenge. Currently,
visualization techniques do not scale. Most techniques are
designed for one size displays—generally a desktop display
(1280×1024 pixels). Techniques need to include displays
that range from wall-sized displays in fusion centers to
PDAs used by field operators.
Software scalability, or the capability of a software
system to permit analysts to interactively manipulate large
data sets, is also a problem. New algorithms are needed that
scale to larger datasets. Software also needs to enable the
transfer data across software systems instead of getting data
locked into non-interacting systems. Other issues are related
to privacy and security, especially when scaling to multi-
user environments. Software must protect data from
inappropriate access down to the item and individual user
level.
2.2 Challenges of data collection
Data are multi-dimensional and vary by source and type
which makes the data collection process very complex. As
noted above, data or intelligence sources range from
SIGNIT, IMINT (which also includes COMINT, ELINT,
and FISINT), MASINT, HUMINT, OSINT, and GEOINT
Typically these data are collected by different organiza-
tions. The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
produce HUMINT and MASINT; the National Security
Agency (NSA) produces most SIGINT; and the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), produces most
IMINT. Thus, the data are usually collected in separate
streams and are have different distribution channels.
Data also vary in types that range from textual data and
databases to image sensor, and video data. Textual data
come from documents, news, e-mails and web pages, etc.
Current targets aim to support “the rate of one billion new
structured messages or transactions per hour, and one
million new unstructured messages or documents per hour”
(Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 24). Databases, constructed to
house the data, are diverse and distributed, many of which
are localized and difficult to integrate with larger databases.
Image data is collected by satellites, surveillance cameras,
and other visual instruments and its exploding volume is
testing data storing and processing limits. Sensor data, such
as data collected about light, temperature, radiation,
location etc., produce very large streaming data. Sensors
not only collect and analyze data, but they can communi-
cate among themselves. Unfortunately, the sensor systems
collect more data than can be combined and warehoused in
a centralized system. Video data also produce streaming
data that has a temporal dimension that is not easy to
integrate with other data types (Thomas and Cook 2005, pp.
24–25). Data types can be refined further by distinguishing
whether they are numeric, non-numeric, or both, and how
they are formatted in the data collection process. Data
formats can range from completely structured, such as
categorical data, to semi-structured, such as e-mail, to
completely unstructured such as a narrative description.
Data can have geospatial characteristics when they are
associated with a particular location or region and temporal
associations that are discrete or continuous or static and
unchanging over time (Thomas and Cook 2005, pp. 108).
Data about dark networks are difficult to collect.
Terrorists survive to the extent their actions are hidden
from scrutiny. The more successful they are, the more
incomplete the data about them will be. Moreover, terrorists
have an incentive to obscure and plant deceptive data in
order to mislead those who attempt to track them. Thus,
most data about terrorists and their operations are likely to
have different levels of uncertainty attached to them. These
uncertainties will become magnified as data are transformed
in the analysis process (see below). In addition, although
terror data usually requires input from all the various
intelligence disciplines, most people believe that terror data
are especially dependent upon HUMINT sources, especially
the kind of HUMINT that is far removed from embassy
interactions and business functions. Terrorists speak and
10 Inf Syst Front (2011) 13:5–19
write in many different languages and come from many
different cultures. Translating and interpreting data about
them often requires specialized language ability and
cultural sensitivity. These skill sets are in short supply,
and given the voluminous data on dark networks, backlogs
on translations and data interpretations are a major
handicap, especially as the volume of data increases.
Furthermore, terrorists’ use of new information technology
makes it more challenging to collect data about them. Fiber-
optic cables make eavesdropping difficult and cell phones,
pagers and the internet make it very tedious and taxing to
shift through massive amounts of data to find communica-
tions of interest.
Data on terrorists are dynamic, not static. Terrorists
travel to conduct operations and change venues in order to
avoid discovery. They seek out protected enclaves with
civilians and neutral parties making their detection and
identification difficult. Not only are they a moving target,
but a great deal of data collected on their activities are
streaming data—data that are continuously being received
and updated at such a steady high-speed rate, that in some
cases, the data may never be stored. Even if data are stored,
they require some combination of bandwidth sufficiency
and, for real-time perception of the data, the ability to make
sure that enough data is being continuously received
without any noticeable time lag (Best 2003). In addition,
special databases have to be designed to support the unique
requirements of terrorist data. Imagery requires different
software, hardware, and bandwidth compared to human
intelligence data and each data source typically fills a
completely different type of field in a database (Best 2003),
making the integration of these data difficult.
2.3 Challenges of data analysis
Data analysis is the preparation, examination and summariza-
tion of data for the purpose of extracting salient features,
including commonalities and anomalies, discovering new
features, developing conclusions, and in the case of confir-
matory data analysis, confirming or falsifying existing
hypotheses. Unfortunately the explosive rate at which data
are accumulating, “our ability to collect data is increasing at a
faster rate than our ability to analyze it” (Thomas and Cook
2005, p. 2).
Analysts have the daunting task of gathering the massive
amounts of information, sorting through it to find the
strands that are relevant to the questions or issues being
addressed, becoming familiar with the essential informa-
tion, and integrating it with the knowledge already gained.
Analysts then must generate multiple explanations, some-
times in the form of hypotheses, evaluate the explanations
in light of evidence and assumptions, and then make
judgments about the most likely explanations or outcomes.
At the completion of the analysis, analysts are required to
generate reports or other products that summarize their
judgments (Tenet 1999: Waltz 2003; Treverton 2001, 2009;
Treverton and Gabbard 2008; Treverton et al. 2006). In
essence, the analyst’s charge is “the application of human
judgment to reach conclusion from a combination of
evidence and assumptions” (Thomas and Cook 2005, p.
6). These efforts require collaboration with teams of people
who typically operate under considerable time pressure
often without adequate training, resources, appropriate
technology and methods.
Complicating the data processing and analysis are the
multiple levels of analysis within the Intelligence Commu-
nity. In the case of DIA, the focus tends to be at the
strategic level of analysis level while in the Marine Corps
the focus tends to be at the tactical level. For example, the
CORP’s Intelligence Analysis System brings all data
collected by the front-line troops into one location for
comparison, analysis, and dissemination. This division of
analytic capabilities into different levels of analysis has
been a serious problem, particularly for combat troops. An
oft-repeated complaint is that data are collected and sent
“up the chain” to be analyzed, but never returned to the
tactical level in a timely manner in order to inform
operations. The charge is that those who need data to
conduct day-to-day combat operations are not those for
whom the data collection and analysis efforts are designed
to support.
Data integration Central to the challenges of data analysis
is data integration—piecing together relevant information
from “divergent multi-source, multi-dimensional, time-
varying information streams” (Thomas and Cook 2005, p.
94).16 Details buried in immigration records, travel docu-
mentation, telephone calls, names and locations of sus-
pected terrorists, updates about terrorist financing and
facilities and streaming data from sensors have to be
synthesized, analyzed, and represented in concert in order
to gain insights about what is happening. However, the
synthesis is more than integration based on data type. Data
come in different levels of abstraction and do not include
information at the same meaning level. They need to be
integrated in such a way so as to create one consolidated
picture of the threat environment. Only then can analysts
concentrate on the meaning of the data rather than on the
form in which the data are initially packaged (Thomas and
Cook 2005, p. 10). Creating this common operational
picture is especially difficult when combating very adaptive
terrorists and insurgent groups that are constantly changing
their tactics and strategies to pursue their aims. There is
16 See also Best (2003, 2006) and Rollins (2008).
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almost no guidance on what data need to be integrated, in
what sequence, and with what level of detail.
I have identified three general approaches to data
integration in the literature: discipline-centric; place-
centric; and virtual. Discipline-centric data integration
evolved from different methodological approaches to data
analysis. Figure 1 illustrates a very early example that
combines troop strength and movement, geography, time
and temperature. The map, based on Minard’s 1869 chart,
graphically illustrates Napoleon’s ill-fated 1812 expedition
into Czarist Russia. The size of the grey-colored bar shows
the relative strength of the French army as it marched
toward Moscow. The black bar reveals how the troop levels
declined over time as the temperature dropped and the
French retreated into Poland. Only 10,000 troops remained
from a force of 422,000.
Other examples of discipline-based data integration are
the studies of relationships among terror networks using
Social Network Analysis (SNA). Often used by sociol-
ogists, this methodology can combine or “stack” infor-
mation about different relations such as kinship,
friendship, finance, education, and religion etc. to form
a composite view of the all relationships (Hanneman and
Riddle 2005). In Fig. 2, we see how NETDRAW, a SNA
software visualization tool, shows three different relations
among the terrorists in Noordin’s Network of Southeast
Asia. Although I am unable to demonstrate the relational
ties in greyscale, a representation in colour would identify
communication relations in red, meeting connections in
blue, and a composite of business, friendship and training
relations in black. Green lines would show multiplex or
overlapping relations among all those in the terror
network.
Place-centric data integration, as the name implies,
occurs in one location. Treverton and Gabbard’s recent
study (2008) found some of the “most interesting” experi-
ments in “multi-INT,” as he refers to data integration,
depend on small and experimental efforts where analysts
have the “license to operate ‘within the security fence,’
sharing information in ways that the originating agencies
probably would not have permitted on a larger scale”
(Treverton and Gabbard 2008, p. 41). Typically these
“fusion” centers involve groups of people, each with
specialized expertise and experience, each drawing on
different data sources, and each coming from different
agencies or organizations. All share their data and attempt
to coordinate their operations. In this instance, data
integration means people integration—people talking to-
gether about their data, deriving some collective interpre-
tation of what they mean, and developing some plan of
action.
One variant of place-centric data integration is what
has been referred to, in all seriousness, as “wheeled
fusion” (Treverton and Gabbard 2008, p. 41). In this
instance, one analyst sits on a chair with wheels on it. He
then rolls himself back and forth between two rows of
long tables, each having a handful of computer screens
representing different kinds of data. Data integration under
these conditions occurs when the analyst’s is able to
understand, integrate, and make sense of all the data in his
own head.
Recent reports from Iraq indicate that military-led teams
coordinated by the Joint Task Force, composed of Special
Operations Troops and backed by specialists in intelligence,
forensics, mapping, politics and computer specialists piloting
unmanned aircraft, have been having some success in counter
terror missions. According to a recent interview with Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mullen, theses fusions cells
in Iraq are netting 10 to 20 captures a night (Warrick and
Wright 2008).
Fig. 1 Napoleon’s invasion
of Russia, 1812 ((http://uts.cc.
utexas.edu/~jrubarth/gslis/
lis385t.16/Napoleon/).)
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Many US placed-based data integration such as those in
Iraq began with the Department of Homeland Security’s
strategic plan. The first objective of the plan was “to gather
and fuse17 all terrorism-related data and to analyze and
coordinate access to it in order to alert people to potential
terrorist or other threats” (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Strategic Plan, 2004, p. 10). In support of this
initiative, many state and major urban areas, funded by the
federal government, established “fusion centers” for all
entities involved in public safety and national security
(Rollins 2006). As of February 2009, there were 58 fusion
centers around the country18 in addition to the Coast
Guard’s two centers located on each coast. Despite the
proliferation of these fusion cells, numerous issues concerning
their functions and operations await Congressional attention:
the clarity concerning the federal government’s relationship
with fusion centers and the potential for drafting of a formal
national fusion center strategy to outline the federal govern-
ment’s clear expectations of fusion centers; the federal
government’s position on sustained funding; the agreement
on metrics to assess fusion center performance; and a
definition of what constitutes a “mature” fusion center
(Rollins 2006).
Virtual data integration Given the limitations of people’s
memory and ability to process information,19 and given the
difficulties of assembling experts from various agencies
together in one locale, virtual data integration relies on
advanced computer and software systems to support virtual
data sharing among analysts from many different organ-
izations. A good example of virtual data integration is “A-
Space,” an on-line collaborative environment that will link
all 16 intelligence agencies.20 A-Space analysts will have
access to shared and personal workspaces, wikis, blogs,
widgets, RSS feeds and other tools. They also will have a
search function that enables them to look for content on
other classification domains, including those that allied
countries share. Most importantly, they will be able to
access data from six data sources from different agencies,
including the National Security Agency, State Department
and Defense Intelligence Agency and more datasets are
expected to be added in the future. Ultimately, the purpose
of A-Space is to create an interactive workspace for
problem solving around which a community of interest
can form to share information, lower barriers to collabora-
tion, standardize analytic processes, and ultimately make
information technology invisible to the analyst.
17 I will use the word ‘fusion’ in a more precise way as we will see
below. In general, practitioners use the word fusion to refer to ‘one-
stop shops’ where coordination across all sectors and levels of
government occurs.
18 http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm.
Fig. 2 Data layering using
NETDRAW (My thanks to
Trond Gimmingsrud of Norway
for this representation of
Noordin’s Networks.)
20 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_intelligence_community_A-Space.
19 See George A. Miller. “The Magical Number of Seven, Plus or
Minus Two.” The Psychological Review, 1956, vol. 63, Issue 2, pp.
81–97
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A-Space went live on the government’s classified Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System Septem-
ber 22, 2008. Sponsored by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence overseen by the Defense Intelligence
Agency, it is based on the standards the Army and the
Defense Department are using for the Army and Defense
Knowledge Online portals. Initial tests of A-Space are
limited to top-secret information, but secret and unclassified
information is expected to become available as the portal
develops.
Data layering and data fusion There are at least two
versions of technical data integration that I have been able
to identify: data layering and data fusion.21 Data layering
refers to the overlay of data on a pictorial image. In the case
of data layering, data are assigned to a general area of the
map rather than geo-coded to a specific location. For
example, Fig. 3 illustrates data layering by indicating the
variation in sigacts (significant activity) based on incident
levels in each Iraqi district. The darkest districts represent
the highest levels of sigacts and the lightest districts
represent the lowest levels. Figure 4 illustrates data fusion,
where each data point is geo-coded and overlaid on a
specific location on the map.
Data layering while useful, does not lend itself to further
data analysis since no data underlie the actual images. The
images are only suggestive not definitive and require
additional analysis with other analytic tools. Data fusion,
in contrast to data layering, co-registers information on a
map display to a precise geographic grid (Treverton and
Gabbard 2008, p. 9). In other words, different data types,
not just pictorial images of the data, are overlaid on the
same geospatial coordinates. This type of fusion is enabled
by software such as ARC-GIS which integrates information
about the human and the geographic terrain. So for
example, the map of Sudan in Fig. 5 illustrates fused data
that identifies the precise location of villages that have been
completely or partially destroyed, along with locations of
the roads, IDP camps, population centers, international and
administrative boundaries, refugee sites and camps, cities,
and airports. Each piece of information is overlaid on
specific geospatial coordinates to create this comprehensive
overview. Fused data can then be subjected to further
analysis to explore the relationships among the data
coordinates as a whole.
Data integration at the fusion level is much more
difficult to achieve than at the level of data layering.
Getting good data to fuse, especially for those working with
open sources, is the most fundamental issue, but there
are other considerations as well. Not all data can be
geospatially fused. Terror relationships are not usually
anchored to specific geospatial coordinates. And relational
data, like all non-spatial information, must be synthesized
at the meaning level before it can be integrated with spatial
data. How this integration occurs, in what sequence and
with what software capability is beyond the scope of this
paper.22 Suffice it to say at this point, data fusion as it is
defined in this section of the paper is a goal but not as yet a
well-supported practice.
2.4 Challenges and their consequences in field settings
The problems of scale and the challenges of data collection
and data analysis outlined above have produced serious
consequences in operational environments like Iraq and
Afghanistan. In a recent study entitled Analytic Support to
Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies, Perry and Gordon
(2008) identify the limitations that currently exist despite
the advances made in data collection and analysis. Section 2
closes with what they have identified as some of the more
serious lapses in our most recent counter-terror and
counterinsurgency efforts. They serve as a reminder of the
work that still remains:
& Although other sources of data about enemy activity in
Iraq are available, the Multinational Command Iraq’s
(MNC-I) major source of information on enemy
activities in Iraq is the significant activities (SIGACTS)
report.23
& Most data collection supports operations and not
analysis. Consequently, data “vary in terms of quality,
accuracy, timeliness, completeness, consistency” (p. 25).
Convincing commanders to collect additional data or to
collect data in formats more amenable for analysis has
been difficult.
& Reporting is uneven. Data are “coded” differently by
different units. What is considered a “significant
incident” varies with the reporting unit’s experience.
Units early in their tours record most incidents even
minor ones while those later in their tours report less
frequently.
21 The use of the terms data fusion in this section has a very specific
meaning. It refers to information that is co-registered to a precise
geographic grid (Treverton 2008, p. 9).
22 Readers are advised to consult the book edited by James J. Thomas
and Kristin A. Cook entitled Illuminating the Path: The Research and
Development Agenda for Visual Analytics for some of the more
technical issues involved in data integration.
23 SIGACTS (significant activities) are recorded online at the brigade
level using an online system called the Combined Information Data
Network Exchange (CIDNE). A significant activity is defined as any
incident deemed important enough to record. For example, attacks on
convoys or locating a weapons cache are considered significant
activities.
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& Multiple databases exist and are not linked or cross-
referenced in Iraq, and to some degree in Afghanistan,
such as the SIGACTS database and CEXC database
which contains forensic data. Many databases are stored
locally and are not easily accessible.
& A standard lexicon is lacking. Database terms are not
consistent and only recently have standard definitions
been applied to data entries in Iraq.
& Most data in Iraq and Afghanistan are collected on
enemy activities, but data on “friendly operations” are
generally not collected. In an insurgency, it is important
to know what friendly units are doing not just what the
insurgents are doing.
& The sharing of data, much of it time-sensitive, is often
inhibited or prohibited by bureaucratic procedures
among organizations that dealing with insurgencies
Fig. 3 SIGACTS in Iraq
2005–2008
Fig. 4 SIGACTS in Iraq
2005–2008
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and terrorists. Sharing intelligence (data) among allied
nations is difficult making analysis particularly prob-
lematic (pp. 26–28).
3 The future: Technological support and the new field
of visual analytics
Getting the appropriate computer equipment with the
appropriate software systems into the hands of those
collecting and analyzing data is critically important in
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Unfor-
tunately, according to recent study by the National
Visualization and Analytics Center (Thomas and Cook
2005), “current technologies do not address the needs for
handling these massive, messy, diverse, and ever-changing
volumes of information” (p. 2), nor do they provide support
for the complex tasks involved in the analytical and
discovery process. In fact, very few of technologies even
address the need to communicate with their audiences about
their analytical results and products. (p. 2). The study’s
authors further state that although we do have numerous
hardware and software systems to help analysts process,
organize, and explore data, we are “only scratching the
Fig. 5 Data fusion of human and geospatial data of the Sudan (My thanks to Ben Maitre for this representation of the destruction in Darfur.)
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surface in terms of meeting the true analytical needs”
(Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 23).
For Thomas and Cook and others, one solution is the
creation of software that will support analysts in the most
time consuming and complex aspects of the analytical
process (p. 23). The software has to be built on the
foundations of reasoning, sensemaking, cognition and
perception in order to support collaborative analytical
processes about complex and dynamic problems (p. 6). It
must have better displays or “spaces” to contain the
relevant data so analysts can visualize the connections
among relevant information from the different source
streams in order to integrate the data and gain insights
from them (Thomas and Cook 2005, pp. 94–98). Further-
more, analysts must be freed from the constraints of current
tools that require them to analyze data of different types
separately. They need to be able to consider all information/
data together, without being restricted by format, type, or
source, including data in motion or streaming data so they
can detect changes. Ultimately, analysts need to go beyond
the current data-type-centric modes of analysis to support
work with dynamic data of all types in a “seamless
environment” (p. 127, p.131–133).
3.1 The discipline of visual analytics
In an effort to address these technological deficiencies, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the
leadership of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL), chartered the National Visual Analytics Center
(NVAC) in 2004. NVAC provides strategic direction and
coordinates activities to discover, develop, and implement
innovative visual analytic methods. The Center’s primary
goal is to establish a long-term research and development
agenda for Visual Analytics—specifically “the creation of
software systems that supports the analytical reasoning
process” (Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 34, emphasis added).
NVAC is central to the emerging science of Visual
Analytics—a multidisciplinary field dedicated to improving
data collection and analysis through the use of computer-
mediated visualization techniques and tools. The purpose of
visually-based analytical reasoning, or visual analytic
discourse, is to maximize human capability to perceive,
understand, make judgments and work collaboratively with
multidimensional, conflicting, and dynamic data, such as
terrorism data. Formally, Visual Analytics is defined as “the
science of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive
visual interfaces” (Thomas and Cook 2005, p. 4, emphasis
added). Visual Analytics concentrates on four major areas:
& analytical reasoning techniques (e.g. developing alter-
native explanations, hypothesis testing, developing
scenarios) that enable users, both individually and
collaboratively, often under extreme time pressure with
limited and conflicting data, to probe data, gain insights
and apply judgments in order to reach conclusions that
will inform assessment, planning, and decision making;
& Visual representations and interaction techniques that
enable users to see, explore, and process large amounts
of data at once;
& Data representations and transformations techniques
that convert all data types, including conflicting and
dynamic data, in ways to support visualization and
analysis;
& And production, presentation, and dissemination tech-
niques that enable the user to transmit the results of the
analysis to appropriate audiences (Thomas and Cook
2005, p. 4).
New visualization software tools are critical to the
analytical reasoning process. The ultimate goal for visualiza-
tion software is to maximize the human capacity to perceive,
understand, and reason about complex data and situations. To
reach this goal, software must be built on theoretical
foundations and principles of reasoning (both convergent
and divergent thinking), sense-making, cognition and percep-
tion. The software also needs to enable analysts to focus on
what is important, solve problems at multiple levels of
abstraction, reason about situations that can change rapidly,
and collaborate with others who come from different
organizations, backgrounds and levels of expertise.
3.2 Developing software platforms for analysis
Contributors to the growing multidisciplinary field of Visual
Analytics are developing the software tools and capabilities to
represent and integrate our data through layering and data
fusion techniques. Two excellent examples of these types of
software platforms are Palantir Technologies24 and ORA.25
Palantir Technologies is a leading company noted for its
integration of structured and unstructured data sources and
its ability to draw in all types of data, including message
traffic, link charts, spreadsheets, text as well as SIGNINT,
ELINT, and IMINT. Its capability of fusing geospatial and
temporal data is particularly useful to commanders and field-
based intelligence cells.26
ORA is a dynamic meta-network assessment and
analysis tool developed by CASOS at Carnegie Mellon. It
contains hundreds of social network analysis metrics and
recently has added two new tools—Loom and ORAGis—to
the ORA Platform that enable the analysis of spatially and
temporally continuous data captured by sensor systems e,g,
25 http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/
24 http://www.palantirtech.com/government/intelligence
26 For an example of a Palantir analysis see http://www.palantirtech.
com/government/analysis-blog/afghan-conflict
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GPS sensors embedded in vehicles or logs of activities.
This capability has enabled researchers, for the first time, to
fuse spatial, temporal and relational data.27
We have monumental data collection and analysis tasks
before us in order to counter terrorism (Davis et al. 2004;
Treverton 2009) and insurgencies (Perry and Gordon 2008).
As summarized above, challenges are great and solutions
will not be short-term or easy. Palantir and ORA, two
software platforms developed for the intelligence commu-
nity, are a good example of the way forward in Visual
Analytics. Despite the challenges enumerated in this brief
overview, they signal the progress made to date and
illustrate the opportunities that await other IS researchers
interested in applying their knowledge and skills to the
tracking and disrupting of dark networks.
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